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CSOCA

18 April 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3

Attention: Colonel Lawlor

SUBJECT: Proposed Reorganization of the National Security Council Staff — Comments of the Comptroller of the Army.

1. Reference: Memorandum from the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council to the Council dated 17 April 1950, subject: "Proposed Procedure for Handling NSC 68". This paper was hand-carried to the undersigned by Colonel Lawlor with request for comments thereon by the Office of the Comptroller of the Army in order to formulate a recommended view to the Secretary of the Army.

2. It is believed that the fundamental principle of representation, on which the proposed organization of the National Security Council Staff primarily rests is faulty. In fact, an organism so constituted cannot properly be called a "staff" at all, under either the generally accepted principles of administrative management or under the principles which govern the organization of military staffs. What results from the proposal is a junior council not a staff. If such a group should attempt to perform staff functions it would find that it is inhibited from doing so by the representative nature of its constitution. Junior representatives of their principals cannot appropriately exercise staff supervision over those principals either individually or collectively. They would be similarly inhibited from performing properly any other functions appropriate to a staff: planning, coordinating, reviewing and analyzing. Further, the de facto organization of such a group would automatically violate the principle that a staff must not be organized on the same breakdown as the immediately subordinate line.

3. In addition to the deficiencies of the proposal on the basis of accepted organizational theory and practice the proposal is deficient on an even more fundamental ground. It is submitted that, at this level of the Government, what is badly needed is a staff capable of a "general" approach rather than a "representative" approach to a solution of the National Security Council problem. Representative groups tend to develop the same weaknesses which attend a "council of war". The best that can usually be expected from such an organism is a compromise between conflicting representative interests rather than the development of general solutions from the standpoint of the general interest.

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4. Although it may well be that junior representatives of the senior members of the Council itself should be present in the secretariat or staff of the Council to assist their principals and to furnish full-time liaison to their respective departments, this liaison or representative group, however, should in no way be considered as the "staff" of the Council. If such a group is needed it should be subsidiary to or separate from a true generalized staff, or secretariat, devoted to assisting the Council in evolving the over-all policies and plans for the integration of domestic, foreign, and military factors relating to the National Security. If this subject is treated solely from the standpoint of the various departments represented on the Council, the standpoint of the "common defense" may tend to be obscured.

5. It is submitted that a more correct approach to the design of a Staff for the National Security Council would be to form staff groups for the following fields:

a. Program Staff (Generalists) for:

- (1) Planning and Policy Development
- (2) Coordination of Program Implementation
- (3) Continuing program review, analysis and reporting

b. Functional Staff (Specialists) for:

- (1) Intelligence
- (2) Psychological and subversive warfare and propaganda
- (3) Military strategy and operations
- (4) Economic resources:
 - (a) Manpower
 - (b) Facilities
 - (c) Material
- (5) Economic warfare
- (6) Civil defense

X. Other functions of security and warfare (in the second half of the XIXth Century) as identified and developed.

6. In the manning of such a staff as suggested above, it might well be that the only source of qualified personnel would be certain Departments of Government (e.g., staff specialists in military strategy would probably be drawn from the Defense Department). But such specialists would not represent the Department. And it might very well be that the most highly qualified brains in several of the essential fields would not be found in Government at all. None of these staff sections would supplant or duplicate the functions of any Department of the Government. They would function solely as an integrating organism

to insure that all functions of modern warfare — whether represented in a statutory Department of Government or not — are properly considered and integrated in the over-all policy planning for national security.

7. Restricting the staff to representatives of existing Departments, as proposed in the subject paper, would appear to be almost a guarantee that no general solution would be sought outside of the limits set within each of the agencies represented. That the totality of the functions represented by the existing agencies would equal the totality of the problem of National Security would be a fortuitous accident. Planning for the national security should not be allowed to rest upon the gamble that such an accident will fortuitously eventuate.

FOR THE COMPTROLLER OF THE ARMY:

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